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Abstract: 
This paper defends the centrality of comedy as paradigmatic of 
political theology by reading the project of Slavoj Žižek through the lens 
of the late British philosopher Gillian Rose. I begin by exploring Rose’s 
recovery of Hegel as means to make good on Marxist social critique with 
particular reference to her non-foundational or ‘speculative reading’ of 
Hegel. I then explore the degree to which her work stands in advance of 
Žižek’s project, arguing that it is her work that makes his project possible 
in the first place. I turn next to the reception of Hegel and comedy, and 
in particular the place Rose awards comedy in Hegel’s work, before 
exploring the central differences between Rose and Žižek’s work: law 
verses the symbolic, and the respective shapes of their political theology. 
Returning to Rose’s remarks on comedy qua law I ask in the final analysis: 
how should we understand the relationship between political theology 
and comedy? Rose I suggest offers a coherent alternative to Žižek whilst 
retaining nonetheless the commitment to Hegelian-Marxist social theory. 
Key words: Žižek, Gillian Rose, Hegel, Comedy, Political Theology
Comedy has long served as a political virtue, not least in the form 
of satire. To draw upon Grigoris Sifakis, under the shield of democratic 
rule and freedom of speech satire is able to direct its arrow, away from 
private adversarial combat, and toward the public figure, a feature which 
deems it a democratic responsibility and public service.1 With this in 
mind one might applaud the recent edited collection Žižek’s Jokes: Did 
you hear the one about Hegel and negation? Yet arguably this work has 
stretched the patience of some critical reviewers: As Robert Eaglestone 
has argued (while nonetheless giving credence to Žižek’s earlier work as 
‘full of insight and intellectual synthesis’) ‘the publisher’s phrase is that 
many of the jokes are ‘nicely vulgar’. In my view this means that lots of 
the so-called jokes are just plain racist or anti-Semitic, many are pretty 
sexist, and some are downright misogynistic.’ Žižek is accused of ‘lazy 
academic prose, very questionable ‘jokes’ and wearing a jester’s hat for 
the intellectual bourgeoisie [which] probably isn’t how the revolution will 
happen.’2 
1  Sifakis 2006, p. 23.
2  Eaglestone 2014.
Political Theology and 
Comedy: Žižek through 
Rose Tinted Glasses
Marcus Pound
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 At the back of this lies the charge that philosophy is being bought 
into disrepute. As Todd McGowen puts it: ‘a general lack of seriousness 
predominates across the spectrum of theorizing today.3 However, in 
defence Mcgowen has argued: ‘One dimension of Žižek’s seriousness 
is his commitment to the joke. Žižek’s focus on jokes is important 
not because it indicates his own pathological need to be considered 
funny—it might or it might not—but because it testifies to his refusal 
to relegate comedy to a position external to theory. He jokes seriously.’4 
And ‘Only in theoretical seriousness does the possibility exist for us to 
give up the quest for a truth based on knowledge and to embrace a truth 
of non-knowledge [non-All] that structures our being. But first we must 
recognize that the path to seriousness is strewn with jokes.’5
 In what follows I wish also to defend more generally the centrality 
of comedy as a theo-political virtue, but doing so by reading Žižek 
through the lens of Gillian Rose. Rose is by no means an arbitrary 
choice. As I further wish to argue, her non-foundational reading of 
Hegel paved the way for Žižek’s work6 and many of her criticisms of 
postmodernism serve in advance of Žižek’s; in particular the critical 
relation between comedy, politics, and theology. This affords us the 
possibility to gain a further critical standpoint on Žižek’s work within a 
shared framework of thought.
 I begin by exploring Rose’s recovery of Hegel as means to 
make good on Marxist social critique with particular reference to her 
non-foundational or ‘speculative reading’ of Hegel. I then explore the 
degree to which her work stands in advance of Žižek’s project, arguing 
that it is her work that makes his project possible in the first place. I 
turn next to the reception of Hegel and comedy, and in particular the 
place Rose awards comedy in Hegel’s work before exploring the central 
differences between Rose and Žižek’s work: law verses the symbolic, 
and the respective shapes of their political theology. Returning to Rose’s 
remarks on comedy qua law I ask in the final analysis: how should we 
understand the relationship between political theology and comedy? 
Rose I suggest offers a coherent alternative to Žižek whilst retaining 
3  Gowan 2007, p. 58.
4  Gowan 2007, p. 66.
5  Gowan 2007, p. 66.
6  More recently, at the Conference Žižek in response to a question about the significance of 
Gillian Rose’s thought affirmed the ‘Broken Middle’ as a key critical category.
nonetheless the commitment to Hegelian-Marxist social theory. 
Rose and Marxism and Hegel
The reception of political theology in recent years has arguably 
contributed to growing scholarly consensus on the significance of 
Gillian Rose. One of England’s foremost continental philosophers 
she was instrumental in the reception thereof during the eighties 
and nineties before she succumbed to ovarian cancer. Her early work 
covered Adorno, the Frankfurt School, and the legacy of Marxism; she 
was instrumental developing a post-foundational reading of Hegel and 
the development of sociological reason, and she was a powerful critic 
of much post-structuralism and postmodern theory. In her later work 
she extolled the classical virtues, inviting her readers to consider what 
is left for philosophy when it has discredited ‘eternity, reason, truth, 
representation, justice, freedom, beauty and the Good.’7
 Rose’s early work took up the challenges of Theodore Adorno 
and the debates of the Frankfurt School during the 70s.8 The crux 
of Rose’s critique of Adorno centred on the neo-Marxist legacy of 
‘reification’ developed by Lukács which broadly speaking describes the 
process by which commodity exchange represents social relations of 
value as if they were a natural property of the commodity.9 According 
to Rose ‘Reification has often been used in order to generalize the 
theory of value and of commodity fetishism without taking up the 
theory of surplus value or any theory of class formation and without 
developing any theory of power and the state.’10 Marx’s theory of value 
is ‘generalised as ‘reification’ with minimal reference to the actual 
productive relations between men, and without any identification of a 
social subject.’11 In short Rose argues that in generalising Marx’s theory 
of value to apply more broadly to culture, many of the neo-Marxists sold 
Marxist theory short and hence undermined the potential of critique to 
conceptualise social inequality. 
 If her early work on Adorno attempted to recover the critical 
potential of Marx for social theory, her subsequent work on Hegel 
7  Rose 1996, p. 1.
8  For an example of the critical reception of the work see Smith 1982, pp. 463-464.
9  In particular see György Lukác’s essay ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’
10  Rose 2014, p. 36.
11  Rose 2014, p. 183.
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attempted to recover the critical potential of Hegel for Marx and 
sociology more generally. In Hegel Contra Sociology, Rose argued 
that the historical development of social theory/sociology in all its 
variants, including the Marxism of the Frankfurt School, remained 
captive to German neo-Kantianism, manifest in the way Kantian 
scepticism reproduces a series of philosophical dichotomies within 
sociological reason: the Kantian split between subjective freedom and 
objective unfreedom, law and morality is repeated in the sociological 
split between values and validity, or meaning/value (Weber) and 
structure/facts (Durkheim).12 Furthermore, as Vincent Lloyd puts it, 
Kant’s distinction between the empirical and a set of transcendental 
presuppositions leaves the latter unaccountable to the former, so to 
take an example: ‘Durkheim took ‘society’ to exist in the transcendental 
register and then applied the category of ‘society’ to his investigation 
of the empirical world without allowing the empirical world to feed back 
into his understanding of society.’13
 And herein lies the overall thrust of her critical enquiry which 
would mark all subsequent work: according to Rose, Hegel’s critique 
of Kant provides in advance a critique of sociological method and the 
means ‘to link the analysis of the economy to comprehension of the 
conditions for revolutionary practice.’14 Where neo-Kantian sociology 
is epistemological in approach, Hegel provides the resources for a 
historical and phenomenological approach which takes into account 
a reason which is motile and able to reflect precisely on its own 
presuppositions. Hence, as with her critique of Adorno, the issue 
can put in terms of a sociological approach which is able to take the 
conditions of emerging social life contextually and aporetically.
 Given the general critique being levelled at Hegel in the climate 
of French post-structuralism the book remains remarkable both for its 
embrace of Hegel, and in particular her post-foundational reading of 
Hege.15 As she would later put it in the introduction to Dialectic of Nihilism
Hegelian and Marxist dialectic does not seek to legitimise the 
12  Rose 1995, pp. 1-13.
13  Lloyd 2011, p. 19. 
14  Rose 1995, p. 220. For a critical appreciation of Rose’s relation to Marx see Gorman 2001, 
pp. 25-36.
15  See for example Derrida Glas 1974.  Galilee, 1974. Significantly the text also leaves the 
reader n with a quote from Hegel on comedy. 
phantasy of historical completion with the imprimatur of supra-
historical, absolute method, but focuses relentlessly on the historical 
production and reproduction of those illusionary contraries which other 
systems of scientific thought naturalise, absolutize, or deny.16
 On Rose’s reading Absolute Spirit amounts to cultural totality 
which includes metaphysics and religion, and rather than view Hegel 
as offering us history as the teleological unfolding of the Absolute, 
her Hegel follows the owl of Minerva, setting wing only after dusk; i.e. 
philosophy always arrives too late. 
 In Hegel contra Sociology this reading is underpinned by the 
significance she develops of Hegel’s ’speculative proposition’ for social 
theory. To read a proposition ‘speculatively’ means that ‘the identity 
which is affirmed between subject and predicate is seen equally to 
affirm a lack of identity between subject and predicate.’ In other words, 
in reading a given proposition one should not assume the identity of the 
given subject as already contained in the predicate, but rather see it as a 
work, something to be ‘achieved’.17
 For example, she claims the principle speculative relation 
is between religion and the state; i.e. the modern antinomy. Read 
simply, the identity of religion and state would be to imply either a 
theocracy, or to imply the idealist goals of religion as something to 
which politics should aspire to reach (e.g. social harmony). However, 
read speculatively the point is that the very distinction between the 
two speaks of the very gap within the foundation of those concepts 
themselves. 
 Hence the significance Rose attributes to rethinking Hegel’s 
Absolute as the basis for social critique. 18  To think the Absolute in this 
regard is to say that we need a speculative reading which traces the 
historical trajectories of the forms of freedom, art, and religions, from 
Greek ethical life to Christian morality and out of which our current 
cultures have emerged.
 Her final paragraph in Hegel contra Sociology is an invitation to 
‘expound capitalism as a culture’, i.e. to take up the Marxist critique 
in a way that secures it’s potential for social critique in contrast to 
16  Rose 1984, p. 3. 
17  Rose 1995, p. 49.
18  Rose 1995, p. 208.
176 177Political  Theology and Comedy... Political  Theology and Comedy...
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1
the neo-Marxist legacy. Indeed, she insists that ‘a presentation of the 
contradictory relations between Capital and culture is the only way to 
link the analysis of the economy to the comprehension of the conditions 
for revolutionary practice’.19 
 In what follows I want to argue that her invitation should be read 
as a programmatic statement of Žižek’s entire project: to revive German 
idealism, and Hegel’s work particular [albeit via Lacan] as a means to 
radicalise Marx’s critique of ideology? This takes the shape of a non-
foundational and comedic reading of Hegel as the basis for political 
theology.  
Žižek and Rose 
Žižek’s non-foundational approach to Hegel is encapsulated in his 
earliest publications such The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989) where he 
claims: ‘Hegelian ‘reconciliation’ is not a ‘panlogicist’ sublation of all 
reality in the Concept but a final consent to the fact that the Concept 
itself is ‘not-all’ (i.e. speculative).20 Yet the instrumental role Rose 
played was only evident a year later in For They Know Not What They No 
when he admonished the reader to ‘grasp the fundamental paradox 
of the speculative identity as it was recently restated by Gillian Rose: 
in the dialectical judgement of identity, the mark of identity between 
its subject and predicate designates only and precisely the specific 
modality of their lack of identity.21 Žižek adopts Rose’s speculative reading 
of Hegel’s thesis on Substance as Subject; Substance as Subject 
means: ‘that non-truth, error, is inherent to Truth itself – to resume 
Rose’s perspicacious formula again, that Substance ‘is untrue as 
Subject’. This means; their very lack of identity […] (the gap separating 
the Subject from Substance) is strictly correlative to the inherent non-
identity, split of the Substance itself.’22 So while in distinction to Rose 
Žižek reads the split subject of Lacan back into Hegel, it is Rose who 
opens up the possibility of doing such by offering a speculative reading 
of Hegel in the first place. For example, one might compare the following 
paragraphs from Rose and Žižek respectively:   
19  Rose 1995, p. 220.
20  Žižek 1989, p. 6. 
21  Žižek 1991, p. 103.
22  Žižek 1991, p. 105.
the separation out of otherness as such is derived from the failure 
of mutual recognition on the part of two- self-consciousness who 
encounter each other and refuse to recognise the other as itself a self-
relation: the other is never simply other, but an implicated self-relation.23
[The] ultimate insight of Dialectics is neither the all-encompassing 
One which contains / mediates / sublates all differences, nor the 
explosion of multitudes […] but the split of the One into Two. This 
split has nothing whatsoever  to do with the premodern notion of […] 
a Whole comprised of two opposed forces or principles […] rather [it] 
designates a ‘split which cleaves the One from within, not into two parts: 
the ultimate split is not between two halves, but between Something 
and Nothing, between the One and the Void of its Place […] -or, in other 
words, the opposition between the One and its Outside is reflected back 
into the very identity of the One.24
 
The similarities in their readings go some way to explain their 
shared antipathy to postmodern ethics: they work too often within a self/
other dichotomy without transposing the very distinction back into the 
subject itself [spaltung].
 What then of Marx? As noted, Rose believed that the treatment 
of reification in post-Marxist thought failed to adequately account for 
the theory of surplus value in the theory of value and of commodity 
fetishism. What Lacan provides Žižek with is a means to make good 
on Rose’s concern. While Lacan initially claimed that Marx’s surplus 
value (i.e. the excess value produced by commodity exchange) finds its 
psychoanalytical counterpart in surplus enjoyment (i.e. jouissance), Žižek 
develops the argument: capitalism is sustained and ‘stained’ by a self-
generating excess which renders the system incomplete.  Only rather 
than mask or hide away this excess, it elevates it to the principle of social 
life: money begets more money. Hence the emergent social forms under 
capitalism can be said to arise historically at the point when surplus 
enjoyment/lack becomes the social principle as a whole – the superego 
imperative of capitalism to enjoy, mastering the drive to consume in 
the endless circulation of desire.25 Žižek thereby shows the necessary 
23  Rose 1996, p. 74. 
24  Žižek 1996, p. xxvi.
25  See Calderbank 2014 who has provided a helpful summary of Žižek’s work in this regard.
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supplement of psychoanalysis in the challenge to expound the link 
between capitalism and culture in a way which Rose was unable.
 If we take then their shared consensus on the speculative 
relation, and their concern for a revitalised Marx we can readily 
appreciate their mutual distrust of the post-secular twist Derrida 
gave Marx. As Žižek says, ‘One of the most deplorable aspects of 
the postmodern era and its so-called ‘thought’ is the return of the 
religious dimension in all its different guises: From Christian and other 
fundamentalisms, through the multitude of New Age spiritualisms, up 
to the emerging religious sensitivity within deconstruction itself (the 
so-called ‘post-secular’ thought).’26 Žižek’s contention is precisely 
the extent it precludes the possibility of a political act (to which I shall 
return). 
 Rose herself had invited Derrida to speak at Warwick University 
where he delivered ‘Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work 
of Mourning and the New International’ (1993). Derrida’s paper served 
as a prelude to his engagement with the spectres of Marx, a topic he had 
resisted approaching for some time. Yet as Rose argues, this is less a 
work of mourning as an ‘aberration of mourning’.27 Derrida twists Marx’s 
famous opening to the Communist Manifesto into a metaphor for what 
remains undeconstructable: the spirit of a Justice to come. At this point 
she takes up the concerns with Marxism that characterised her early 
studies of Adorno and Hegel. Derrida she argues, in spiritualising Marx 
disregards ‘the body of Marxism…Class structure, class consciousness 
and class struggle, the party, the laws of capitalist accumulation, the 
theory of value, human practical activity. All (but justice) is vanity in 
Derrida’s reading, ‘mirror-images of the rigidities of logocentricism’.28  
As Rose puts it: ‘Derrida has forgotten Marx’s materialism and Hegel’s 
Logic’,29 and the messianic aspect of Marxism which Derrida rescues 
is but ‘correlate of this missing impetus.’  All of this is said to stem 
from Derrida’s ‘logophobia’, ‘a sub-rational pseudo-Messianism’ which 
disqualifies both ‘critical reflection and political practice. It is a counsel 
of hopelessness which extols Messianic hope’.30 
26  Žižek 2001, p. 1. 
27  Rose 1996, p. 65. 
28  Rose 1996, p. 66. 
29  Rose 1996, p. 67. 
30  Rose 1996, p. 70. 
  In sum, both Žižek and Rose adopt a non-foundational approach 
to Hegel, which is to say both adopt the speculative standpoint in such a 
way as to revive the basis of a Marxist critique. In particular, Žižek resists 
with Rose the post-secular turn in favour of a model which takes serious 
the notion of surplus value and class relations.
The comedy of Hegel
As Rose says: ‘Marxism ignored the comedy of Hegel.’31 Whereas 
Kierkegaard employed humour in his critique of Hegel32 to short circuit 
any anxiety on the part of a student in the face of the System and its 
metaphysical hubris, Rose employs comedy ‘to provide a route into his 
[Hegel’s] thinking which bypasses the mines of prejudice concerning 
Hegel as a metaphysical thinker.’33 In this way she aims to convince of 
the significance of the speculative standpoint as a means to make good 
on Marxist social critique. For Rose, Hegel should be read as a comic 
thinker. In this way Rose pits Kierkegaard against Kierkegaard in the 
name of Hegel, thereby highlighting the proximity of the two thinkers. 
 Arguably there is a historical precedence for the ‘comic’ reading 
of the Phenomenology. As Mark Roche has argued, the view that tragedy 
in Hegel is the highest of the dramatic forms is widespread, yet this 
is a 20th Century quirk.34 Hegelian scholars in the 19th Century such as 
Christian Weisse, Arnold Ruge, and Karl Rosenkranz – largely forgotten 
now – by contrast were more likely to focus on comedy.35 Moreover, 
comedy has the last word in Hegel’s Aesthetics.36  
 According Roche, Hegel’s own theory of comedy is linked to his 
understanding of subjectivity: ‘What is comical… is the subjectivity that 
31  Rose 1996, p. 64.
32  Consider for example the following extract from Kierkegaard’s Sickness Unto Death: ‘A 
thinker erects a huge building, a system, a system embracing the whole of existence, world history, etc., 
and if his personal life is considered, to our amazement the appalling and ludicrous discovery is made 
that he himself does not live in this huge, domed palace, but in a shed alongside it, or in a doghouse, or 
at best in the janitor’s quarters’ (43-44).
33  Rose 1996, p. 12.
34  See Roche 1998. Indeed, the argument may be extended in part to the 21st century. David 
Farrell Krell for example has argued more recently – and especially in regard of Schelling and Hölderlin 
– that German Idealism more generally is caught within a ‘double movement’: the rise of tragedy in the 
aesthetics, and the tragic fall of the absolute, skilfully highlighting the link between the two. Krell, 2005, 
p. 1. 
35  Roche 1998, p. 306.
36  Roche 2001, p. 411.
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makes its own actions contradictory and so brings them to nothing.’37  
By subjectivity is meant, the elevation of self-consciousness as opposed 
to objectivity (i.e. cultural norms).  Hegel links comedy to the rise 
of subjectivity – comedy stages the battle between on the one hand 
moral customs and law (objective) and the subject for whom moral 
customs are no longer the highest. Hegel’s use of comedy emphasises 
the role of contradiction and need for resolution. As Roche says ‘In a 
sense comedy functions as an aesthetic analogue to Hegel’s practice 
of immanent critique, by which the philosopher seeks to unveil self-
contradictory and thus self- cancelling positions.’38 Comedy is a form 
of ‘immanent negation’ 39(Roche’s translation) – what is negated is the 
false elevation of subjectivity or particularly (e.g. the man who slips on a 
banana skin while his thoughts are set upon the stars).40
 Roche’s approach develops comedy as a category within the 
trajectory of Hegel’s work as a whole, as if this was what Hegel would 
have said had he himself further developed the category; Roche 
thereby adopts a foundational approach to Hegel’s work. By contrast 
Alenka Zupančič’s book on Hegelian comedy The Odd One In while 
underlining Hegel’s discussion of comedy qua representation and 
the historical development of drama in the Phenomenology adopts the 
non-foundational reading of Hegel which is developed in tandem with 
Lacan. Here the approach is meta-theoretical, framed by the distinction 
between a Kantian or Hegelian framework, and an associated question: 
at what point is a joke inherently transgressive or truly transgressive? 
The former implies a joke which is transgressive of a situation but which 
nonetheless helps confers stability on that situation – for example, the 
libidinal joke employed to release the tension of a situation and hence 
maintain the situation. The latter implies a joke which is able to offer 
an entirely new perspective on the given situation. This argument is 
developed with a materialist thrust: if jokes have traditionally been 
on the side of materialism (and hence anti-theological), usurping the 
universal in favour of the particular (i.e. jokes target the false elevation 
of subjectivity as in the example of the man slipping on the banana 
skin), her point is that these jokes don’t go far enough. A joke may bring 
37  Hegel, Aesthetics, quoted in Roche 2001, p. 412.
38  Roche 2001, p. 415.
39  Roche 2001, p. 415.
40  For Kierkegaard for whom it was the false elevation of objectivity which marked comedy.
us back to earth with a thud, but it still leaves the possibilities of the 
heavens intact. Recalling Rose’s thesis it could be said that Zupančič 
finds in Hegelian logic first: a critique in advance of the type of comedy 
which relies on a residue Kantian transcendentalism; second, a means 
to reinvigorate Marxist materialism with Lacanian ontology through the 
release their thought forms give from transcendence (what Lacan called 
the non-All).41
 What concerns Rose is ‘not what Hegel says about comedy as 
such, but the movement of the Absolute as comedy’; a meta-theoretical 
approach which, like Roche and Zupančič sees comedy as constitutive of 
the system. How so? As Rose says: 
Let me shoot from the pistol: first, spirit in the Phenomenology 
means the drama of misrecognition which ensures at every stage and 
transition of the work – a ceaseless comedy, according to which our 
aims and outcomes constantly mismatch each other, and provoke yet 
another revised aim, action and discordant outcome.” Secondly, reason 
is therefore comic, full of surprises, of unanticipated happenings, so that 
the comprehension is always provisional and preliminary.42 
 For example, one can imagine a situation in which a chance 
encounter between a couple leads to a romance which ends in marriage, 
such that chance leads to a harmonic reconciliation – the protagonists 
imagine themselves as agents of action; but their subjectivity is shown 
to be illusionary, chance is at play.  The goal however reveals that only 
when our natural inclinations are thwarted is the true goal revealed – 
what Hegel called the cunning of reason.43 
 What all this points to is the suggestion that it is not that the 
Phenomenology is not funny, merely that we need to perceive the inherent 
comedy when the speculative standpoint is addressed. To take an 
example which both Rose and Žižek consider, Hegel’s chapter ‘the 
animal spiritual conceit’.44  As Rose points out, the very title is comic in 
as much the contradiction gives rise the speculative relation. The animal 
spiritual is premonition of the false dilemma of the modern state – rights 
41  Zupančič  2008.
42  Rose 1996, p. 72.
43  See also Roche 2001, p. 415. 
44  Rose 1996, p. 75
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of individuals and rights of state. Where someone acts in the name 
of one’s subjective right on the basis that it is universal, when what is 
really at stake is his or hers own self-interest. Comedy arises out of 
the contradiction, i.e. when individual rights are the means to employ a 
supra-individual power such that ethical substance (objective freedom) 
migrates to the hapless subject.45
Law and the Symbolic
At this point one should attend to Rose and Žižek’s differences. If 
there remains a significant difference between their approaches it can 
be summed up in terms of the difference between law or jurisprudence 
and the symbolic. Rose’s interest in jurisprudence surfaces in her 
middling to later work, and in particular in conversation with the post-
structural approaches of Derrida and Foucault, taking centre stage 
finally in The Broken Middle. Briefly put, Rose argues that jurisprudence 
was a central concern of the philosophical tradition from Kant onwards, 
yet post-structuralism abandons both reason and law in the name of the 
end of metaphysics, without appreciating the ways in which those self-
same thought forms remains indebted to the terms of its engagement 
and series of conceptual antinomies. As she says in her introduction:
This essay is an attempt to retrieve and rediscover a tradition 
which has been tendentiously and meretriciously ‘deconstructed’ […] 
This destruction of knowledge is justified by its perpetrators as the 
only way to escape the utopian projections and historicist assumptions 
of dialectic; ‘eternal repetition of the same’ is said to be a harder truth 
than the false and discredited promise of reconciliation. Yet neither the 
form of this hard truth nor the terms in which it is expressed are neutral: 
they are always borrowed from some historically identifiable epoch of 
juridical experience.46
 Another way to grasp the significance of law for Rose is in terms 
of the persistent line of her critical enquiry which is to develop critical 
theory which resists transcendental arguments regarding society in 
favour of a logic which can reflect on its own presuppositions. Law is the 
term for Rose which re-establishes the field of social critique. 
45  Hoff 2014, p. 235 ft9. 
46  Rose 1984, p. 1. 
 Rose took the rhetoric of post-structuralism to be highly critical 
of reason, thereby precluding the power of thought to criticise its own 
concepts. For example, Foucault reduces knowledge to power in such 
a way as to evade the claims of a rational critique. Similarly, Derrida’s 
grammatology stages the usurpation of law and reason through the 
practices of writing while relegating ethics to a fetishized ‘other’. And 
in social terms, because both Derrida and Foucault underwrite their 
philosophy with Nietzsche they usurp the basis of social theory in favour 
of the sheer arbitrary imposition of power, the consequence of which 
compounds the abandonment of reason in the embrace of nihilism. 
 Recalling her thesis in Hegel contra Sociology, it can be said that 
the postmodern inscription of power works as a Kantian transcendental, 
even at the point Derrida and Foucault critique Kant. For example, for 
all their problematizing of an arche or telos, foundational beginnings or 
Utopia ends, it is the middle which is evaded, the irresolvable aporia 
which arises between the universal and particular, politics and ethics, 
rhetoric and reason, at the bar of Law. 
 In developing her concept of law she turned to Kierkegaard 
and Freud amongst others to excavate what she calls the ‘middle’ – 
shorthand for the speculative standpoint. The Broken Middle offers a 
way of thinking about politics and ethics, the universal and the singular. 
The ‘middle’ is a third space, not a unitary space (e.g. the neutral space 
of secular liberalism) but a place of anxiety to the extent it is the sheer 
‘givenness’ of the political and ethical situation which resists the 
retreat into sanctified beginnings or utopian ends. It is not a matter of 
employing political or ethical solutions to unify society’s diremptions 
[divorce] such as law/ethics, the very fields arise already out of the 
process of diremption.47 Her aim then is to recover anxiety within our 
political and ethical discourse, ‘re-assigning it to the middle.’48 
 For the reasons above, Rose remained critical of the Lacanian 
symbolic.49 Law is not ‘the superior term which supresses the local and 
contingent, nor is it the symbolic which catches every child in the closed 
circuit of its patriarchal embrace. The law is the falling towards or away 
from mutual recognition, the triune relationship, the middle formed or 
47  Rose 1992, p. 286.
48  Lloyd 2007, p. 699.
49  See Rose 992, pp. 102-103.
184 185Political  Theology and Comedy... Political  Theology and Comedy...
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1
deformed by reciprocal self-relations’.50
 Yet arguably Rose’s assessment of the symbolic remains 
problematic, it being predicated almost entirely upon the lecture ‘The 
Circuit’ from Seminar II and the edited texts from Seminar XX translated 
by her sister.51 Moreover she reads the latter text on sexuality back 
into the earlier text from Seminar II – thereby presenting his work in a 
synchronic manner which misses the development of concepts; hence 
her conclusion: the symbolic is a closed patriarchal system. What about 
the non-All?  
 Nonetheless, the Broken Middle provides for Rose the standpoint 
for the critique of political theology, and serves in advance of Žižek.  As 
noted, both Rose and Žižek share a disdain for the political theology 
of Derrida, albeit whilst articulating one as such. Yet in Rose’s work 
it remains a pejorative term. ‘Holy middles’ are mended middles and 
hence aversions to the law. Taking on the theological left in the form 
of Marc C. Taylor’s A/Theology, and the theological right in the form of 
John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory she shows how both offer a 
flight from the middle. In the case of Taylor’s postmodern a/theology 
we are offered a philosophical approach based upon the gesture of 
a violent transgression in the usurpation of existing law – the death 
of metaphysics and the constitution of a new law. In the case of John 
Milbank (whose on work draws heavily upon Hegel contra Sociology and 
Dialectic of Nihilism),52 the argument is forwarded that properly speaking 
theology is a social theory, one in which we are promised liberation from 
social and political dominium in some ‘expectant city’. 
 However, as Rose puts it, between the two we are slung between 
‘ecstasy and eschatology, the promise of touching our own most 
singularity [Taylor] and the irenic holy city [Milbank], precisely without 
50  Rose 1996, p. 75.
51  See Mitchell and Rose 1982.
52  In Theology and Social Theory (1996a) Rose was the Blackwell reader for Theology and 
Social Theory. In the book Milbank develops Rose’s critique of neo-Kantian sociology and in particular 
its reduction of religion to the immanent plane. He adopts a genealogical method to show how the so-
ciological, political, and economic positioning of religion is only achieved to the degree those disciplines 
mask their theological leanings, and that properly speaking theology is a social theory. The difference 
between secular and theological versions is the former’s arbitrary commitment to a version of the will-to-
power, as opposed to the primacy of charity.
any disturbing middle.’53  
 It would not be difficult on this basis to fashion a Rose tinted 
critique of Žižek along the lines of her critique of political theology, 
before doing so let us rehearse Žižek’s political theology. 
Žižek’s Political Theology
Žižek’s political theology takes its orientation from Hegel’s kenotic 
logic (God’s self-emptying). ‘What dies on the cross is indeed God 
himself; not just his ‘finite container’’54 but the God of the beyond – 
the God of metaphysics. Thereafter ‘Spirit’ names the community of 
believers, the purely corporal body of the church; that is to say, the 
realization of the cross is the release it brings from transcendence, 
making it homologous to Hegel’s ‘night of the world’. Translated into 
the concerns of Marx, kenosis provided the basis for the political 
gesture, ending ‘obfuscation and fetishization, and liberation into the 
inexplicable joy and suffering of the world.’55  
Indeed, Žižek goes as far as to suggest that theology offers the 
first critique of ideology in the biblical figure of Job.56 Confronted with 
his suffering Job refuses the justifications offered by his theological 
interlocutors, they seek only to give a sense of metaphysical meaning 
to his suffering (e.g. you suffer in this life because…); rather, Job 
maintains fidelity to the very meaninglessness of suffering to the 
extent that even God cannot explain it. And because Žižek reads Job 
topologically, i.e. as the precursor to Christ,57 he is able to further claim 
that Christ’s cry of dereliction upon the cross is the point at which God 
faces up to his own powerlessness: God is an atheist.58 
So while Žižek agrees with Marx that all criticism begins with 
the critique of religion, he is subsequently able to claim that theology 
contains a subversive materialist core through its incarnational logic 
53  Rose 1992, p. 285. Rose was the Blackwell reader for Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory. 
The Rose archives at Warwick include the letters Milbank and Rose exchanged on the subject. In 
particular she pushed him to clarify the nature of the subject which underpinned Theology and Social 
Theory. In response Milbank wrote ‘The Sublime in Kierkegaard’, Milbank 1996.
54  Žižek and Milbank 2009, p. 257.
55  O’Regan 2010, p. 283.
56  Žižek 2003, p. 124.
57  Žižek 2003, p. 122.
58  Žižek 2003, p. 14.
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which releases Christianity into the world; and through which Marxism 
must pass to achieve revolutionary praxis.
In practical political terms this translates into what Žižek calls 
politics proper: ‘a politics of the act, i.e. an act of symbolic dereliction.59 
This is not politics as administration, as Žižek says, ‘there is no ethical 
act proper without taking the risk of such a momentary ‘suspension 
of the big Other,’ of the socio-symbolic network that guarantees the 
subject’s identity’60; i.e. a ‘self-destructive act [kenotic] could clear the 
terrain for a new beginning’61 
However from Rose’s perspective, Žižek’s politics of transgression 
concerns only the foundation of law, the event as such, and therefore 
an evasion of law, a holy middle. Indeed, Žižek goes as far as to 
suggest that the heroic gesture of God’s kenotic love ultimately awaits 
Christianity: ‘in order to save its treasure, it has to sacrifice itself.’62
 We can further develop Rose’s critique by returning to her 
general critique of French thought: ‘the whole of recent French 
philosophy is melancholic’. Drawing on Freud distinction between 
mourning and melancholia she claims that ‘they see life as founded on 
absence that we’re always illegitimately trying to make present.’ In Lacan 
for example, Rose claims Kierkegaardian repetition becomes twisted 
into the search for the lost object (objet a) within the concatenation of 
language.63 Likewise, Žižek’s philosophy seeks to abolish representation 
and complete the translation of modern metaphysics into ontology 
via the non-All. By contrast the work of mourning suggests that in our 
confrontations with violence we take up the task of justice and political 
action with ‘renewed and reinvigorated for participation, ready to take on 
the difficulties and injustices of the existing city.’64
 If Rose’s work can be considered political theology it is for three 
reasons: first, because she takes the speculative relation between 
59  Žižek 1999, p. 246.
60  Žižek 1999, p. 263-264.
61  Žižek 2000, p. 151. Arguably the violence of his language is tempered in subsequent fashion-
ing of ethics. Adopting the language of Bartleby the Scrivener he advocates the suspension of the big 
Other through a passive withdrawal from the symbolic networks, encapsulated by the line “I prefer not 
to.”
62  Žižek 2003, p. 171.
63  Rose 1992, pp. 102-104
64  Rose 1996, p. 36.
religion and the state as the constitutive antinomy of modernity; 
second, because the social import of the Hegelian Absolute implies the 
totality of culture and as such religion; and third because she claims 
the philosophical legitimacy of the universal. When later pushed on 
the particular question ‘So you believe in something outside of the spatio-
temporal continuum?’ she replied, ‘Certainly, yes. But I think one has 
to preserve agnosticism about it. I love what Simone Weil said, that 
agnosticism is the most truly religious position. You must be able to 
say you don’t know. Agnosticism is the only true religion because to 
have faith is not to give up knowledge, but to know where the limit of 
knowledge is.’ This, I wager, is not the wishy-washy agnosticism of the 
undecided, but of a commitment to our ‘existing cities’ as an expression 
of the middle and the justice it serves through critique. 
Comedy and Law
In her critique of postmodern ethics of otherness which she 
characterised as melancholic, Rose argued that we need to inaugurate a 
process of mourning, which ‘requires a relation to law that is presented 
by the comedy of absolute spirit as found in Hegel’s Phenomenology.’65 
What does she mean precisely? As we saw, against post-structuralism 
she claimed all dualistic relations to the other (e.g. an ethics posited 
in terms of self/Other) are ‘attempts to quieten and deny the broken 
[dirempted] middle, the third term which arises out of misrecognition.’66 
This ‘third term’ is law which arises out of the very misrecognition: ‘My 
relation to myself is mediated by what I recognise or refuse to recognise 
in your relation to yourself; while your self-relation depends on what you 
recognise of my relation to myself’67  ‘The law, ‘in all its various historical 
adventures – [is] the comedy of misrecognition.’68 And this makes the 
meaning of law inseparable from the meaning of Bildung, i.e. education, 
formation, and cultivation.
 Returning then to Hegel she says ‘As a propaedeutic to politics, I 
offer the comedy of absolute spirit as inaugurated mourning: the recognition 
of our failures of full mutual recognition, of the law which has induced 
our proud and deadly dualism, of the triune law – implicit but actual – 
65  Rose 1996, p. 74.
66  Rose 1996, p. 75.
67  Rose 1996, p. 75.
68  Rose 1996, p. 75.
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which is always at stake.’69
 In short, and drawing upon John Baldacchino’s insights into 
Rose: ‘If Spirit embodies the drama of misrecognition, comedy ensures 
that history remains contingent, and reason full of surprises. Law looks 
to comedy as the becoming of possibilities that allow us to engage in 
life’s contingencies.’70  
Political Theology and Comedy
How then are we to understand the link between political 
theology and comedy? What both Žižek and Rose accomplish is a non-
foundational reading of Hegel which links comedy and theology to 
social critique by way of the speculative standpoint. In Rose’s work the 
speculative standpoint is synonym for the broken middle; in Žižek’s work 
– I would wager – it can be construed in terms of the real of existence 
(the symbolic real): the constitutive moment of anxiety within law in a 
way which as yet may prove to furnish Rose’s though. Moreover, both 
offer a path to revitalise social critique in a way which avoids the traps 
of Kant’s legacy within Marxist social thought (i.e. transcendental 
arguments for society); maintaining instead a commitment to a political 
critique of the economy. Yet both offer radical alternatives encapsulated 
in their respective question on God: agnosticism versus Christian 
atheism; law versus the symbolic. In the former comedy provokes the 
awareness of misrecognitions which beset our historical development, 
which is held yet within the tension between the universal and the 
singular. In the later comedy provokes a more dramatic and materialist 
rendering of the situation – an ontology of non-All – with the political 
aim of founding a new universal. Hence Žižek’s comic approach remains 
entirely transgressive, one which seeks a fundamental shift in the 
symbolic situation as such in an attempt – if not to think beyond the 
cultural hegemony of capitalism – to carve out the space for such a new 
beginning. 
 However, we can refract this argument through psychoanalytic 
terms as Natalija Bonic has done in discussion of Zupančič’s work: the 
aim of psychoanalysis [and by extension politics] is not to ‘bring about 
a shift of perspective, in the sense of a profound transformation of how 
we perceive the world. It is rather part of comic practice that functions 
69  Rose 1996, p. 76.
70  Baldacchino 2012, p. 190.
through endless repetition and doubling, the aim of which is to allow two 
mutually exclusive (and under ordinary circumstances only alternately 
visible) realities appear side by side, so as to reveal the gap that unites 
and separates them.’71 Or to put it in explicitly theological terms:  what if 
salvation does not simply promise a form of deliverance from suffering 
(a cure of sorts), but by removing the limit that separates it from joy; a 
case of what Latin Church would call godimento? 
 For Rose this would constitute a comedy which has nothing to do 
with the ironic comedy of postmodernism, caught forever in its peculiar 
melancholy that seeks the lost object it never had in the first place. Nor 
is this the transgressive comedy which, with Nietzsche, heralds a new 
law. Rather, as she says: ‘Comedy is homeopathic: it cures folly by folly. 
Yet anarchy exposed and enjoyed presupposes a minimal just order 
[…]. Suffering can be held by laughter which is neither joyful nor bitter: 
the loud belly laughter, with unmoved eyes, from North Carolina; the 
endless sense of the mundane hilarious of one who goes to Mass every 
day.72
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